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INFORMAL RULEMAKING: IN QUEST OF NUCLEAR
LICENSING REFORM
By JAMES WILLIAM BAIN*
In recent years, efforts to reform the nuclear licensing process
have generally been unsuccessful. The last significant effort was
made by the Atomic Energy Commission in August of 1972 when
the restructured rules of practice were adopted.' These rules, de-
signed to make licensing more efficient, did not accomplish their
purpose. Delays have continued and have even increased so that
today nuclear power plants have become a less attractive alterna-
tive for producing energy-not because of public health and
safety considerations and not because of environmental impacts
but because of the ever-increasing time needed to license and
construct a nuclear plant.' Legislation providing comprehensive,
fundamental reforms in nuclear licensing is desirable; however,
it may not happen soon.' If it does not, what can the industry
* The author is an attorney for the Tennessee Valley Authority Division of Law; J.D.,
1976, University of Florida; B.A., 1972, University of Connecticut; Member, Florida Bar,
American Bar Association. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect those of TVA.
37 Fed. Reg. 15,127 (1972).
2 In the period of 1963 and 1964 when the first large nuclear plants were ordered, the
average time between the filing of a construction permit application and the granting of
the permit was 9 months. In 1970, this application time increased to 20 months and has
since risen to 41 months in 1977 and is continuing to rise. This delay has continued to
increase even though the early plants represented innovative technology, whereas the
technology of the current plants has remained stable for years. This delay is a direct result
of the growing regulatory load. The Atomic Industrial Forum's licensing review group
recently concluded that the current licensing process itself adds fours or five years to the
overall project time. For example, in 1972, nuclear plants were subject to 32 Regulatory
Guides (a report promulgated by the NRC Regulatory Staff which, although not legally
binding as a regulation, outlines acceptable methods for implementing NRC's regula-
tions); this number was doubled in 1973; and the number has continued to increase at an
astounding rate. Presently 250 Regulatory Guides and Branch Technical Positions are
either in existence or under development. As a consequence, the period now required to
construct a large nuclear power plant can extend over 12 years.
' The long-awaited legislative nuclear licensing reform proposal by President Carter,
H.R. 11704 and S. 2775, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), has not yet emerged from either the
House (Science and Technology, Interior and Insular Affairs, and Interstate and Foreign
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itself do to initiate reforms? Industry should consider engaging in
some self-help. Rulemaking, largely neglected as a reform tech-
nique, may provide an opportunity for this self-help. In order to
effectively utilize rulemaking, new trends in the law must be
recognized, understood, and applied.
Courts required administrative agencies, including the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC),4 to adopt adjudicatory pro-
cedures in informal rulemaking proceedings. The requirements of
due process5 and the applicable provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)l provided no firm foundation for the impo-
Commerce) or Senate (Environment and Public Works) Committees which are consider-
ing it. Additionally, the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment indicated
that it will substantially revise the bill before it is reported to the full committee.
' The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (Supp. V 1975), abolished
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and divided its duties between the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA). NRC received the licensing and related regulatory functions of the AEC. The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975),
outlines NRC's powers and duties. Hereafter, the AEC and the NRC may be jointly
referred to as the Commission.
See California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1967);
Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922, rehearing
denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964). The Constitution does not mandate an across-the-board right
to oral argument in administrative proceedings. FCC v. WRJ, 337 U.S. 265 (1949). The
Supreme Court has held that the requirement of an opportunity for oral argument varies
from case to case in accordance with differing circumstances, as do other procedural
requirements; in some cases it is essential to due process, Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S.
373 (1908), while in other situations opportunity ;or submitting written comments is
sufficient, Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936). This distinction arises from the
difference between adjudication, in which a small number of persons are "exceptionally
affected, in each case upon individual grounds" and rulemaking in which policy-type rules
generally affecting a large number of persons are promulgated. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915). The Supreme Court recently cited
the Bi-Metallic distinction with approval and reemphasized that the due process clause
recognizes the distinction between "proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-
type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed
facts in particular cases on the other." United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224, 244-45 (1973).
When rules of general applicability are involved, Bi-Metallic indicates that the Con-
stitution imposes no procedural constraints upon the agency. Bi-Metallic, supra at 445.
But cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973) (where due
process did not require that administrator afford hearings prior to approving state air
quality plan). This conflict is epitomized by the important due process concept that the
practical needs of effective government must be balanced against the need to protect
individuals against unfair official action. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, Pub. L.
No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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sition of these procedures, but were used as a judicial springboard
for them. Courts, starting with the express APA requirements and
the requirements of fundamental fairness, engaged in creative
lawmaking by basing their holdings on the necessities of adequate
judicial review. In addition to this putative reason for imposing
such procedures, there were other basic and often unstated rea-
sons: constriction of administrative discretion and the necessity
of making factual determinations in informal rulemaking pro-
ceedings. These three factors, acting synergistically, led to an
expansive interpretation of the APA requirements for informal
rulemaking. Although the Supreme Court recently reversed a
decision imposing adjudicatory procedures in an informal rule-
making context,' the Court presented no resolution of the under-
lying problems which caused the Court to impose the procedures.
These problems must be understood if one is to comprehend
where rulemaking was, where it is, and where it is going.
Reform of the nuclear licensing process through informal
rulemaking provides the impetus for this article. It will outline
the law concerning rulemaking, how it was recently changed, and
the reasons why courts required administrative agencies to adopt
procedures in excess of traditional rulemaking requirements. Fi-
nally, the article will demonstrate how the nuclear power indus-
try can utilize rulemaking to accomplish its purpose.
I. BACKGROUND
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 s grants the NRC the author-
ity to "make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this [Act]." Rulemaking has been the primary method chosen
by the NRC to interpret its obligations under the Atomic Energy
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. 0 Once passed,
I Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978), rev'g Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547
F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Id. at § 2201(p) (1970).
0 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). This act requires all federal agencies
to evaluate environmental impacts by utilizing "a systematic, interdisciplinary approach"
of "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the
seminal case of Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.




rules and regulations adopted in informal rulemaking proceed-
ings have the force of law." Both the APA I' and the NRC's regula-
tions' 3 grant "interested persons" the right to petition for the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. The courts of appeals
have exclusive jurisdiction to "enjoin, set aside, suspend (in
whole or in part), or to determine the validity of . . . all final
orders"' 4 "for the issuance or modification of rules and regula-
tions"' 5 of the NRC.
The APA provides the format for administrative lawmaking
by the NRC under the Atomic Energy Act." Two alternative
types of procedures for the promulgation of rules are expressly
established by the APA. One, known as "formal" rulemaking, 7
closely resembles adjudication"8 and is only required to be utilized
in a limited number of circumstances. 9 Formal rulemaking is
only required where the authorizing legislation requires the rules
See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 309 (1964).
12 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976).
13 10 C.F.R. § 2.805(b) (1977).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) (Supp. V 1975).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970). Jurisdiction may be obtained by any party aggrieved by
the order who files a petition in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970). Alternatively,
an aggrieved party may obtain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970), which has
been amended to eliminate the requirement of a specified amount-in-controversy as a
prerequisite to the maintenance of any "action brought against the United States, any
agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." Pub. L. No.
94-574, § 703, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976). The Supreme Court has interpreted the effect of this
modification as conferring authority on federal courts to review agency action regardless
of whether the APA may itself serve as a jurisdictional predicate. Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2331 (1970). This section also authorizes the Commission to promulgate
regulations providing for parallel procedures designed to safeguard and prevent disclosure
of restricted data or defense information.
'7 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976) (hereinafter also referred to as "sections 556-557").
The APA requires essentially the same procedures for formal rulemaking as for
adjudication, as in both cases there is a hearing with a right of cross-examination before
an administrative judge. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1976). Some differences exist, however, in-
cluding allowing settlements in adjudications, 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1) (1976); allowing all or
part of the evidence to be submitted in written form in rulemaking when a party will not
be prejudiced thereby, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976); allowing the decision of the hearing
examiner to be omitted because rulemaking is not subject to 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976); and
not applying the separation of functions requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970) to rule-
making.
11 Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need
for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276, 1278
(1972). See generally Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Cm.
L. REV. 739 (1976).
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to be made "on the record after opportunity for an agency hear-
ing. '" 2" The second rulemaking provision, "informal" or "notice
and comment" rulemaking,2' requires no formal hearing and is
applicable to the great bulk of rulemaking authority bestowed on
Federal agencies.
Section 553 prescribes three obligations for the rulemaking
agency. First, public notice must be published in the Federal
Register stating the time, place, and nature of the proceedings,
"the legal authority under which the rule is proposed," and
"either the terms of substance of the proposed rule or a descrip-
tion of the subjects and issues involved. '22 Second, interested
persons must be granted "an opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. '2 3 Fi-
nally, the agency must "incorporate in the rules adopted a con-
cise general statement of their basis and purpose.""
Because of the relative informality of section 553 procedures
and the extreme costliness in time, staff, and money of sections
The Supreme Court interpreted this hearing requirement in United States v. Flor-
ida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). This case concerned the power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) to promulgate incentive per diem rates under the Interstate
Commerce Act,which provides that the rate prescription should be be made only "after
hearing." 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970). The ICC promulgated the rates after publishing a
notice and soliciting comments on proposed rule. The Court held that section 1(14)(a) was
not the equivalent of a requirement that the rule be made "on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing" as the APA requires to make the hearing requirements of sections
556-557 applicable. Rather, the ICC's rulemaking proceeding was governed by section 553
of the APA, which authorizes an agency to restrict interested parties to the submission of
written evidence and argument without oral presentation and, accordingly, upheld the
ICC's rule. The Court reasoned that, despite the paucity of statutes where the words "on
the record" or their equivalent appear, courts are obligated to adhere to the congressional
language and must find the requisite phrase before directing the application of sections
556-557. The Court in effect rendered the Interstate Commerce Act's express requirement
of a "hearing" nugatory, as section 553 would have required these minimal procedures
even if the act had been silent.
Despite the inapplicability of sections 556-557 in these circumstances, the Court did
not rule out such application in all statutes which do not prescribe in haec verba that the
hearing be "on the record," nor did the Court elevate this phrase to sine qua non status.
410 U.S. at 238. However, after Florida E. Coast Ry. it is unlikely that a court would
require a formal rulemaking proceeding when the statute calls for a "hearing", unless the
statute is unmistakably clear, as by the addition of "on the record," or unless the legisla-
tive history clearly provides for such a proceeding.
21 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as "section 553").
" 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(I)-(3) (1976).




556-557 procedures, the vast majority of administrative agencies
utilize informal rulemaking. The Supreme Court has demon-
strated its reluctance to prescribe formal rulemaking proce-
dures. 25 The ponderousness of formal rulemaking renders innova-
tion difficult, allows exigencies to often go unmet, and fosters
changed conditions prior to the completion of the proceeding.
These factors cause the industries which are subject to adjudica-
tory regulation to be left in a state of perpetual uncertainty.6 By
contrast, informal rulemaking combines the advantages of legis-
lative decisionmaking with some of the requirements of an adju-
dicatory proceeding. The agency is not limited to a decision based
entirely on a carefully delineated record; rules can be promul-
gated efficiently and expeditiously and a broad base of public
participation is encouraged because participation may be in writ-
ten or oral form without the necessity of undergoing prolonged
cross-examination. While these formidable advantages are widely
recognized, at some point the wide range of discretion committed
to the administrator gives cause for alarm. Nonagency partici-
pants have had the impression that this very flexibility and lack
of adjudicatory safeguards have denied them a "full hearing."
The Atomic Energy Act does not mandate a hearing "on the
record" either on its face or as judicially construed .2 Accordingly,
the Commission took the position early that formal rulemaking
procedures were not required by the Atomic Energy Act.29 Despite
21 Cf. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
" This was the position of the utilities regulated by the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) prior to the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), which allowed
more informal rulemaking procedures and allowed the FPC to set rates for an entire area
in one proceeding.
' See, e.g., American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Siegal
v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
14 See Siegal v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968), wherein the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia upheld the Commission's use of informal rulemaking procedures.
The court explained section 553 as follows:
This language seems to say, and has been read by an authoritative source
as saying, that the formal procedures of Sections 7 and 8 [of the APA|
obtain only where the agency statute, in addition to providing a hearing,
prescribes explicitly that it be "on the record." [Here the court cited page
314 of the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
(1947) in a footnote.] There is no such prescription in the Atomic Energy
Act, either in terms or by clear implication ...
Id. at 785.
" See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM, ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2
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the absence of a statutory obligation, the Commission has on
occasion granted extensive procedural rights to afford the public
an opportunity for more significant participation.30 Such partici-
pation can generate public confidence in rulemaking and can
facilitate the representation of otherwise neglected values.3' Judi-
cial recognition of the public's role has fostered the gradual ero-
sion of the restrictive standing doctrine, which had previously
curtailed the public's intervention .32
II. HYBRID RULEMAKING AND ITS UNDERLYING FACTORS
Both courts 33 and commentators34 have advocated that the
APA's strict dichotomy between formal and informal rulemaking
should yield to a more flexible analysis which would be guided by
considerations of due process and public policy and which would
produce ad hoc procedures tailored to fit each rulemaking scena-
rio. The courts are confronted with a dilemma in this area: they
must effectively perform their reviewing role and therefore re-
quire explanations and reasons for the agency's actions; 3 but they
must recognize that the rulemaker should not be circumscribed
by onerous, time-comsuming adjudicatory encumbrances 3 and
that the courts should not substitute their decision for the
agency's.37 As a potential solution to this problem, some courts
compelled agencies to afford opponents of a rule substantial pro-
IMPROVING THE AEC REGULATORY PROCESS 149 (Comm. Print 1961).
-o See Freeman, The AEC's Recent Experiment in "Evidentiary" Rule Making, 28
Bus. LAW. 663 (1973).
Johnston, AEC Rulemaking and Public Participation, 62 GEO. L.J. 1737 (1974).
32 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970) (standing to seek judicial review need not flow from any express Congres-
sional grant); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970) (a court must determine whether
Congress precluded judicial review); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (standing does not require the assertion of
an economic interest); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (aesthetic or environmental interest is
sufficient to confer standing). But cf. Easton Utils. Comm'n v. AEC, 424 F.2d 847, 850-
53 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (untimely application to intervene precludes standing).
13 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251-54 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
3, See, e.g., Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Somme Recent
Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 85-88.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
S See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
17 Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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cedural protections by mandating adjudicatory procedures de-
spite the absence of an "on the record" hearing requirement."
Several of these cases did not place their brands of rulemaking
anywhere within the APA classification;39 rather, this procedural
imposition was labeled "hybrid rulemaking."'' The Supreme
Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc." stayed the judicial hand which
mandated adjudicatory procedures in informal rulemaking con-
texts. Although courts may no longer impose rigorous procedural
requisites upon the rulemaking process, the factors which
prompted this judicial response still exist and will continue to
influence judicial review of agency actions. To fully understand
this area of the law and to comprehend the significance of the
Supreme Court's recent landmark case, the three primary factors
underlying hybrid rulemaking must be understood. These factors
are outlined in the next three subsections. The fourth subsection
demonstrates how these factors were used to expand the scope of
section 553.
A. Constriction of Administrative Discretion
Agencies, unlike courts, have express authority to make law
prospectively through the exercise of rulemaking power and have
commensurately less need or reason to rely on ad hoc adjudica-
tion in formulating new standards. 2 Although all potential prob-
lems cannot be handled through rulemaking, agencies should
strive towards filling the interstices in their authorizing statutes
through the promulgation of rules. 3 Rules have the salutary effect
of exposing agency policy to public scrutiny, whereas case-by-
case adjudication, with its limited effect and restricted participa-
3, See text accompanying notes 161-176, infra.
", See Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (declining
to reach classification problem); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500 (4th
Cir. 1973) (discarding APA classifications for determining the type of hearing required);
Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (basing the impositions of
procedural requirements on considerations of "fairness").
1* See, e.g., Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure
Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHi. L. REV. 401 (1975).
' No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
,2 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
' Id. Commentators have also exhorted agencies to make greater use of rulemaking.
See, e.g., Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rulemaking, 59 NEV. U.L. REv.
781 (1965); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
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tion, often does not." Absent promulgation of rules, administra-
tive actions are often chaotic and inequitable because neither the
parties nor the administrators know what standard is to be ap-
plied. " In recognition of these factors, agencies which had pre-
viously promulgated policy in ad hoc piecemeal fashion through
adjudication are now adopting prospective policy standards,
rules, and regulations, which apply generically to a variety of
parties in eclectic situations. The pattern of promulgating regu-
lations is especially prominent in the agencies entrusted with
environmental and energy problems."
Many statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Act, merely es-
tablish a legislative framework within which the administrator
enjoys broad discretion when promulgating rules.47 Congress, in
recognizing this fact, evinced serious misgivings about agencies
utilizing minimum notice and comment rulemaking procedures.
During the last decade, many statutes have required procedures
in excess of minimum notice and comment rulemaking proce-
dures. 48 These contrast with most older statutes which do not
impose any procedural requirements for rulemaking. 49
" See Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking,
26 AD. L. REV. 199, 202 (1974).
See generally Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1962).
" That both Congress and the agencies emphasize and favor rulemaking over adju-
dication as the most efficient and useful means of promulgating administrative policy is
demonstrated by the statutory authority bestowed upon the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). EPA has been specifically authorized to establish, in conjunction with
state governments, comprehensive standards for pollution control by focusing on broad
environmental questions involving different pollutants in diverse industries and areas. See
Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567
(1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1265 (Supp. V 1975)); Clean Air Act amendments,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976)). Simi-
larly, the NRC has been prolific in the promulgation of rules, regulations, and standards.
See 10 C.F.R. §§ 0-170 (1977).
" The court in Siegal v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968), stated: "Congress agreed
by enacting a regulatory scheme which is virtually unique in the degree to which broad
responsibility is reposed in the administrative agency, free of close prescription in its
charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the statutory objectives." Id. at 783. See
also Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396
(1961).
" Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need
for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276 (1972).




Rulemaking protects the rights of individual parties by cir-
cumscribing unguided discretionary power to decide individual
cases. 0 Similarly, in some cases, the broad discretion to fashion
generally applicable rules must be subject to some restraint. If
only notice and comment procedures are used, the record is ordi-
narily so unfocused and ponderous that the administrator could
find support for choosing any of the alternatives offered."
Courts, in refusing to blindly rely upon the unstructured ex-
ercise of administrative discretion,52 have required agencies to
clarify decisionmaking standards, to consistently apply these
standards to guide their decisions, and to state findings of fact
and the reasons for decisions. The courts, demonstrating their
uneasiness about the extent of administration discretion, have
felt that justice requires judicial intervention to circumscribe
unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power. 3 However, in
any endeavor to circumscribe agency action, the court must fully
allow for the reality that agency matters typically involve some
quantum of expert discretion.54 Expertise may form a legitimate
basis for rules resolving questions of policy, but it cannot justify
procedural inadequacy in factual controversies. Expertise is
strengthened in its proper role when it is denied the opportunity
to "become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its
discretion.""
See Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby
v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
" See City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1074 (1972).
52 See Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, (D.C. Cir.
1971), wherein the court stated that:
Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself
will confine and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should require
administrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern
their discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible . . . . Discretion-
ary decisions should more often be supported with findings of fact and rea-
soned opinions.
Id. at 598.
See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
Professor Davis has argued that arbitrary administrative action can be effectively re-
stricted only by requiring agencies to formalize their policies in clear rules of prospective
application.
" See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 290-92 (1965); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB,
379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
11 Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962)).
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B. Factual Determinations in Informal Rulemaking
Three types of questions are raised in rulemaking proceed-
ings: policy questions, factual questions, and interdependent
questions of policy and fact. Although many of the issues pre-
sented to the NRC are primarily technical, other issues involve
trade-offs between competing values and judgments of broad so-
cial and environmental import. Resolution of such policy ques-
tions denigrates the significance of detailed factual investigation
and minimizes the need for the constraints afforded by the proce-
dural protection of an adjudicatory hearing.5" Policy issues dis-
guised as scientific problems should not be consigned to technical
experts nor decided by administrators and reviewing judges, but
should be directly confronted as questions of policy by the elected
representatives of the people. However, in the absence of congres-
sional action, policy issues must be decided in rulemaking pro-
ceedings open to broad public scrutiny. This is the type of issue
which pure notice and comment procedures were designed to re-
solve.
Conversely, adjudicatory procedures work best with narrowly
defined factual issues.57 Informal rulemaking is handicapped in
its fact-resolution endeavors by the absence of a clearly defined
mechanism to sift the many topics addressed in the comments;
such sifting would occur if testimony was shaped by witnesses
subject to cross-examination. Hybrid rulemaking decisions at-
tempted to diminish informal rulemaking's fact-finding inade-
quacies by mandating the application of the traditional methods
relied on by Anglo-American jurisprudence to ensure accuracy in
adversarial proceedings-adjudicatory procedures,5 including
cross-examination with its unique potential as an "engine of
truth."59 Of course, after Vermont Yankee, this is no longer a
U See Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 408 (1975).
", See Hamilton, note 48 supra, at 1313. Cf. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type
Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REv. 585, 586 (1972).
See Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 739,
743 (1976).
" International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Commentators are divided over cross-examination's utility in resolving factual matters in
administrative proceedings. Compare Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:
Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 522 (1970) ("cross-examination can serve a more valuable function
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viable option. 0 Courts are now limited to examining the factual
in testing forecasts and generalized conclusions underlying future policy planning than in
making findings concerning specific past events"), with Homburger, Functions of Orality
in Australian and American Civil Procedure, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 9, 36 (1970) ("If cross-
examination really is the 'greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,' one
wonders why other legal systems have not imported that fabulous 'engine' ").
" The Court set forth a number of policy reasons for refusing to allow courts to impose
adjudicatory procedures on administrative agencies. In order to evaluate the effect of the
Court's opinion, these reasons must be examined. First, the Court reasoned that if courts
are allowed to review agency proceedings to determine whether the agency employed the
"best" procedures, judicial review would be totally "unpredictable." No. 76-419, slip op.
at 24 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978). The reasoning underlying this reason is hard to fathom;
judicial review should be no more "unpredictable" if additional procedures are available
as a remedy. None of the hybrid rulemaking cases mandated a particular procedure-they
required a system of procedures as a means of developing an "adequate record." If an
agency develops a record without utilizing such procedures, it could nevertheless be ade-
quate. Such procedures should be permissible if they are used as a tool to remedy a
perceived inadequacy, but not if they are used to evaluate the agency's proceeding. Judge
Friendly places this debate into perspective:
It is thus not too consequential whether a court invalidates a rule on the
ground that the procedures have not developed substantial evidence to sup-
port it or even evidence adequate to rebut a claim that it is arbitrary and
capricious, or, instead, takes the route of prescribing ad hoc procedural re-
quirements in addition to those of section 553. Although the former course
seems more in keeping with the statutory language and less likely to promote
undue judicial activism, the practical result is much the same. Both roads
lead to the conclusion that an administrator engaged in rulemaking governed
by the APA cannot always be sure that rudimentary notice and comment
procedures . . . will always suffice.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1314 (1975). The Court also
fears that if agencies are forced to operate under such a "vague injunction," they "would
undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance," thus losing all the
inherent advantages of informal rulemaking. No. 76-419, slip op. at 24 (Sup. Ct. April 3,
1978). This concern, although possessing superficial validity is in part untrue and in part
exaggerated. Courts mandating hybrid procedures granted agencies discretion in adopting
procedures so long as "reasoned decisionmaking" was assured. There would be no need
for an agency to adopt full adjudicatory procedures for the limited-effect, noncontroversial
rules that compose the bulk of rulemaking proceedings. The Court recognizes this fact in
its opinion when it states: "Since 1970 [after American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d
624 (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966), the seminal case in hybrid rulemaking]
the Commission has conducted a large number of rulemaking proceedings, some of which
involved matters of substantial importance, and almost none of which involved cross-
examination." No. 76-419, slip op. at 21 n.17 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978). Although during
this time period NRC had not been required to adopt such procedures, other agencies had
been so ordered, and it was not unforeseeable that a court would order NRC to use similar
procedure in a future situation.
The Court gives as its third reason the fact that agency procedures cannot be looked
at with hindsight; rather, the procedures must be evaluated on the basis of the information
available when the procedures were formulated. The final reason presented by the Court
is also hard to decipher as it does not fit into any syllogistic pattern. The Court reasoned
that informal rulemaking under section 553 does not require an agency to rely exclusively
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underpinning of a rule without mandating procedures to assist
them in this task; the agency itself must determine what type of
procedures will ensure an adequate record.
The most difficult issues in NRC rulemakings, however, in-
volve questions of policy and interdependent questions of com-
plex technological and environmental fact for which pure infor-
mal rulemaking may not be sufficient." However, across-the-
board use of formal rulemaking procedures is unpalatable be-
cause that would militate against the advantages of informal
rulemaking. Adjudicatory procedures have both advantages and
disadvantages depending on the function they are to achieve.
Superimposing the adjudicatory model on administrative deci-
sionmaking in a complex scientific and technological scenario
exposes the shortcomings of adjudicatory techniques. The NRC
has been entrusted with broad powers and multiple functions and
is not expected to behave as an impartial umpire presiding over
a private dispute.2 NRC proceedings focus on future, not past,
events and their consequences. Most importantly, this type of
issue cannot be couched in a form conducive to a simple answer;
rather, the NRC must balance competing values when consider-
on the transcript generated at a hearing, or to hold a formal hearing at all. From these
premises the Court concludes that "the adequacy of the record . . . is not correlated
directly to the type of procedural devices employed, but rather turns on whether the
agency [complied with the APA and other relevant statutes]." Id. at 25. The Court could
not have meant that using adjudicatory procedures to gather more evidence and to focus
the information it received would not make the record more "adequate." Although such
procedures may not be necessary to render the record adequate, the "record," regardless
of how it is defined, must be more complete after using such procedures. Considering the
historical context in which this opinion was written, this reason can only be interpreted
as requiring courts to ensure that the agency complied with the statutory minimums
without prescribing hearing procedures to generate on-the-record testimony in support of
the rule generaged. In light of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), and its progeny,
the Court could not have meant that the agency is not required to take a "hard look" at
the major questions before it and to support each major portion of its rule with some data
and reasoning. See, e.g., Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
' See Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 193
(1974).
2 In re Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 752 (1977); In Re Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units
1 and 2), ALAB-123 6 AEC 331, 335 (1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.; Aeschliman
v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom.; Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct.
April 3, 1978). See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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ing the vagaries of an uncertain technology applied in a context
of scientific dispute.
Perhaps the wisest course in resolving this type of issue is
the middle ground in which the agency would use the most effica-
cious procedure for each type of dispute. No single set of proce-
dures will be appropriate for all NRC rulemakings because of the
diversity of issues and the variety of factual and policy questions
involved. The NRC should discriminatively use hybrid proce-
dures, so that mundane noncontroversial rules could be promul-
gated with dispatch, but the NRC would have the option of in-
creasing the quantum of information submitted for more signifi-
cant rules. What is needed is some pattern of procedures to fully
develop the record and to supply the basis of judicial review. 3
This maintains administrative flexibility, but can also be condu-
cive to administrative confusion and delay. 4 As yet, no precise
formula for ascertaining the procedural aspects of such proceed-
ings has emerged.
C. The Requirements of Judicial Review
The scope of judicial review is outlined in section 10(e) of the
APA,15 which provides that a reviewing court shall set aside
agency action found not to meet six separate standards. The
APA putatively describes two alternate standards of judicial re-
view: (1) "arbitrary and capricious" 7 in informal rulemaking pro-
" International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
", See FitzGerald, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission and the Flexibility
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 26 AD. L. REv. 287, 299 (1974).
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
" The reviewing court shall . .. hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without
observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial
evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F)
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
Id.
,1 Although no APA provision states expressly the appropriate standard of review for
informal rulemaking it is widely assumed that 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), which states:
"The reviewing court shall .. .set aside agency action . . . found to be .. .arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," is applicable
to informal rulemaking. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the
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ceedings and (2) "unsupported by substantial evidence" 68 when
either formal rulemaking is involved or the agency's authorizing
legislation requires it. 9 Courts have applied both standards to
informal rulemaking
70
1. The Traditional Tests
The potential differences between these two standards lie in
the review of the agency's factual findings.7 The Supreme Court
has defined the traditional substantial evidence standard as man-
dating a determination of whether the agency's decision was rea-
sonably supported by the record as a whole. 2 The reviewing court
must ensure that evidence used in making predictions was ade-
quately adduced and rationally applied. Exercising review under
this test, a court cannot disturb the factfinder's resolution of
conflicting evidence merely because it is "clearly erroneous," but
can only upset those determinations which are "patently unrea-
sonable. 7 3 Additionally, courts are less inclined to delve into the
United States, 1 CFR § 305.74-4 (1977); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd,
407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
0 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). ("The reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency
action . . . found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence." Id.).
" The introductory clause of section 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976), limits the appli-
cation of section 10(e) by providing that, "This chapter applies ... except to the extent
that . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." This section means
that to some extent agency action may be committed to agency discretion with no judicial
review, but that such delegation need not be an all-or-none proposition. A reviewing court
may not set aside an agency's decision to the extent that discretion is committed to the
agency. This has been held to be a narrow exception and is applicable only in those rare
instances where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
law to apply." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). See
also Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 58-
83 (1965); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REv. 367 (1968).
"s See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (substantial
evidence test); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(arbitrary and capricious test); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir.
1973) (substantial evidence test).
"' Under both standards the agency's policy choices are reviewed under the arbitrary
and capricious standard which allows a court to defer to agency discretion if the policy
choice is rationally related to the factual findings. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943). See also Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of
Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199. The Supreme Court in Bowman Transp., Inc.
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284-45 (1974), approved this unsym-
metrical treatment of fact and policy questions.
7 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951).
" See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.02 (1958).
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record when its factual underpinning is not "provable" within the
judiciary's accepted definition of "proof."74 By contrast, the tra-
ditional arbitrary and capricious standard was limited to merely
determining whether the agency possessed sufficient authority to
issue the rule and whether a rational basis for the rule exists, 15
i.e., whether any set of facts could be imagined to support the rule
in question."
2. The Appropriate APA Standard of Review for Informal
Rulemaking
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Automotive
Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd77 held that, unless clearly re-
quired by the agency's organic statute, the substantial evidence
test is inapplicable to informal rulemaking.78 In this case, manu-
facturers of automobile accessories challenged a regulation pro-
mulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act,79 which required all new cars to be equipped with frontseat
head restraints.0 The manufacturers argued that the act's re-
quirement that the agency file with the court "the record of the
proceedings on which the Secretary based his order"'" necessi-
tated formal rulemaking. The court rejected this argument and
approved section 553 procedures.2 The "record" requirement was
met by filing all information the agency had before it when it
made its decision.83 In dicta, the court stated that the substantial
" See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973), where EPA was attempting to predict future events with no past experience on
which to rely and with sketchy and speculative factual information on the available
emission control technology. Similarly, in Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Department of Labor was attempting to promulgate an exposure
standard based on a problematical prediction of the percentage of asbestos workers who
would develop fatal cancers in two to three decades if subjected to some unknown level of
exposure through a biological mechanism as yet unidentified.
11 See, e.g., United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940); Superior Oil
Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964). See L. JAFFEE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 564 (1965).
'" Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Id. at 337. Accord, Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1973);
Boating Indus. Ass'n v. Boyd, 409 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1969).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1390 (1976).
"o Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 202, 33 Fed. Reg. 2945 (1968).
A' 15 U.S.C. § 1394(a) (1976).




evidence test is applicable only to formal rulemaking and adjudi-
cation. The court in describing the appropriate standard of review
under section 706(2)(A) stated: "The paramount objective [of
judicial review] is to see whether the agency, given an essentially
legislative task to perform, has carried it out in a manner calcu-
lated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in
the formulation of rules for general application in the future." 4
However, the Sixth Circuit obfuscated this clear analysis by
reaching the opposite conclusion in Chrysler Corp. v. Department
of Transp.15 The court held that the applicable scope of review
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act is the
substantial evidence test and rejected the test set out in
Automotive Parts as providing "virtually no review at all.""
The court in City of Chicago v. FPC7 described the purpose
of reviewing rulemaking actions as determining whether a rea-
soned conclusion from the whole record could support the prem-
ises upon which the agency decision rests.8 The substantial evi-
dence test in the court's view is an application of this analysis to
a particular kind of record-one containing specific information
tested by cross-examination.89 The court in effect obliterated all
distinctions between judicial review of formal and informal rule-
making except the name. This broad scope of review was based
on an analysis of the nondelegation doctrine. Although rulemak-
ing is a quasi-legislative function, it is not the equivalent of legis-
lative action, and agency findings of fact are not accorded the
same deference as legislative conclusions. If an agency's find-
ings were exempt from judicial review, the law governing dele-
gation would be "little more than formalistic mutterings," as it
would make little sense to require the legislature to articulate
intelligible standards to govern agency action of an authentic in-
quiry into whether those standards are being complied with vel
non is foreclosed.9 The court concluded that inquiry into the
factual predicate for adopted rules is authorized and that the
m Id.
472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 667.
" 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 744.
"Id.
" Id. at 742.
"1 Id.
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nature of the inquiry depends on the nature of the record on
review."
These cases demonstrate the lack of consensus as to the ap-
propriate standard of review."3 This disagreement has helped
erode the traditional distinction between the respective standards
of judicial review of rulemaking. 4 The merging of reviewing stan-
dards has rendered mechanical labeling of the appropriate re-
viewing standard a Sisyphean effort, which is often counter-
productive because it obscures the mandatory flexibility of judi-
cial review. 5 The label used to identify the type of review is not
as important as the judicial philosophy underlying review.
The increased judicial vigilance" demonstrated in rulemak-
ing actions and the consequent reduction in the deference ac-
corded agency discretion 7 stems from the emergence of broad and
12 Id. at 743.
93 The Supreme Court has further obfuscated the matter by apparently equating
formal and informal rulemaking and assuming that substantial evidence is the appropri-
ate standard for reviewing informal rulemaking. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 753 (1972); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S.
649, 671-73 (1972); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15.(1971).
However, Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973), clarifies the situation by limiting
judicial review of informal rulemaking to the arbitrary and capricious standard of section
706(2)(A). See Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed
Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750, 1757 (1975).
U See Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d
342 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[In the review of rules of general applicability made after notice
and comment rulemaking, the two criteria do tend to converge." Id. at 349-50.). National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concur-
ring) (agency abuses discretion and acts arbitrarily and capriciously if its actions are not
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 705).
0 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISmTRATIvE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01 (1976) (judges accept
or reject agency rules not by applying a formula of judicial review, but by discerning the
level of care used in the development of the rule); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951) (lack of certainty in the standard of judicial review reflects the impossibil-
ity of a single formula describing all factors involved in judicial review). Cf. City of
Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" See L. JAPFEY, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINsTRATIVE ACTION 589 (1965). The new
judicial activism is in marked contrast to the prevalent attitude of earlier days succinctly
epitomized by Chicago B & Q Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907), wherein the Supreme
Court upheld the "sensible judgments" of a board of tax assessors on the ground that they
"express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis." Id. at 598.
"7 Prior to Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), reviewing courts,
even when utilizing the substantial evidence standard, often felt constrained to uphold
the agency's determination if it was supported by some evidence anywhere in the record
"without reference to how heavily the countervailing evidence may preponderate." Id. at
481. Universal Camera changed this attitude by requiring that the decision be supported
by the record "as a whole."
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sweeping rulemaking authority. Agencies can affect individual
rights and interests throughout society without any type of hear-
ing,"5 and this broad authority evokes an apprehensive judicial
reaction. The broad sweep of the statutes also promotes a height-
ened belief in the importance of providing participation by inter-
ested parties and careful articulation of agency methodologies
and conclusions. Perhaps the emphasis on an increased opportun-
ity for participation in the rulemaking arena is a manifestation
of an analogous phenomenon in other areas. Since Goldberg v.
Kelly,"5 there has been a torrent of due process cases in disparate
areas of governmental activity in which the Supreme Court has
expanded the hearing requirement.'00 However, the case which
directly propagated rigorous scrutiny of administrative actions is
the Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens To Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe.'0'
3. Overton Park's Substantial Inquiry
Although dealing with judicial review of an administrator's
informal decision and not informal rulemaking, the Overton Park
decision has been repeatedly applied to rulemaking proceedings.
This case dealt with the scope of the Secretary of Transporta-
tion's authority under the Federal Highway Act, which author-
ized expenditure of federal funds to construct highways through
public parks only if no "feasible and prudent" alternative exists
and if such program is designed to minimize harm to the park.'0
The Secretary concurred in the judgment of local officials that
the highway should be built through the park, but did not include
a statement of his factual findings in his decision. The district
court and the court of appeals upheld the Secretary's determina-
tion, believing that the Secretary had broad discretion and that
reviewing courts had a narrow scope of review.' 3 The Supreme
Court reversed, rejecting these contentions and subjecting the
Secretary's decision to judicial review under the APA.'0 '
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
* 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"' See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
101 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
102 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
113 401 U.S. at 409.
I" Petitioners were entitled to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976), which
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The Supreme Court went on to order the district court to
conduct a plenary review of the Secretary's decision' 5 based on
the full administrative record that was before the Secretary when
he made his decision. If the record does not disclose the determi-
native factors in the Secretary's construction of the evidence, the
district court was empowered to require additional explanation,
even to the extent of requiring administrative officials to give
testimony explaining their actions. 0
The critical portion of the decision dealt with the standard
of judicial review under APA section 706. The Court held that
despite the inapplicability of the substantial evidence test to the
Secretary's decision, "the generally applicable standards of § 706
require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry." 0,
After recapitulating the aphorism that the Secretary's action is
entitled to a presumption of regularity, the Court declared that
"that presumption is not enough to shield his action from a thor-
ough, probing, in-depth review."108
Under Overton Park, a court has three functions to fulfill in
reviewing agency action. First, it must delineate the scope of the
agency's authority and discretion and then determine whether
the agency acted within the scope of its authority by scrutinizing
the facts.10 Second, the court must find that the actual choice
provides that the action of "each authority of the Government of the United States" is
subject to judicial review unless there is a statutory prohibition on review or where
"agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." The Court held that there was
"law to apply" and the "committed to agency discretion" exemption of 5 U.S.C. §
701(a)(2) was inapplicable. 401 U.S. at 410.
I0 On remand, the district court conducted a "substantial inquiry" by mandating
diverse procedural safeguards. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp.
873 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). The court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to
determine whether the record was complete and to explore the mental processes of the
agency personnel. Id. at 877. They were also entitled to adduce expert testimony to show
that feasible and prudent alternative routes existed and to evaluate the Secretary's inves-
tigation of such alternative routes. Id. Finally, a plenary hearing was conducted which
consumed 25 trial days and admitted 240 exhibits and 287 pages of posttrial briefs. Id. at
878.
, 401 U.S. at 420. Although such an inquiry into the mental processes of the deci-
sionmakers is usually to be avoided, if there are no contemporaneous formal findings, such
an inquiry may be the only effective method of judicial review. Id. See Nathanson, Probing
the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations & Standards of Judicial Review Under
the Administrative Procedure Act & Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1975).
10, 401 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). Informal rulemaking is reviewed under the same
standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
401 U.S. at 415.
' Id. at 415-16.
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made was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law" in order to uphold the
agency action. To make this finding the court must again scruti-
nize the facts to determine whether the "decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors" and whether there has been
a "clear error of judgment.""' 0 In both cases, the inquiry into the
facts must be "searching and careful.""' Finally, the court must
determine whether the agency followed the necessary proce-
dural requirements."' In essence, this three-part analysis advo-
cates a vigilant approach to agency review in which the court does
not make the ultimate decision, but insists that the agency take
a hard look at all relevant factors.
4. Application of Overton Park to Informal Rulemaking
No firm consensus exists for the method of applying the
Overton Park standard of review to informal rulemaking or for the
proper amount of scrutiny to be used in reviewing the factual
basis of agency action."' The opinions presented in Ethyl Corp.
v. EPA"' demonstrate a continuum of views on this issue by
contrasting the views of the judges of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals."5 This case involved a petition to review an
EPA order under the Clean Air Act requiring an annual reduction
in the lead content of gasoline."'
Judge Wright, writing for the majority,"7 affirmed the Ad-
ministrator's decision and rejected petitioner's objection that
three notice and comment periods were procedurally defective." 8
In upholding the administrative action, Judge Wright described
Id. at 416.
Id.
11 Id. at 417.
See generally Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Pro-
posed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750 (1975).
"' 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
IS The opinions of this court have special importance for administrative law because
it is an optional venue under a plethora of regulatory statutes, it has exclusive jurisdiction
over the actions of EPA under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1970 & Supp. V
1975), and it has attracted the largest share of environmental litigation. See Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1310 (1975).
", 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(1)(A) (1970).
Judge Wright's majority opinion was joined in by Chief Judge Bazelon and Circuit
Judges McGowan, Leventhal, and Robinson.
"1 541 F.2d at 48.
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the standard of review of informal rulemaking"9 as "a highly
deferential one" which "presumes agency action to be valid," but
which is not merely superfluous or a rubberstamp for the agency
decision.'2 He went on to state that no inconsistency exists be-
tween a deferential standard of review and a requirement that the
reviewing court involve itself in even the most complex eviden-
tiary matters; the more technical the case, the more intensive
must be the court's effort to comprehend the evidence. 21 This
immersion in the evidence is designed solely to enable the court
to determine whether the agency decision was rational and based
on consideration of the salient factors. Judge Wright in analyzing
Overton Park concluded that it no more than affirmed the tradi-
tion rational basis test.
122
[A]fter our careful study of the record, we must take a step back
from the agency decision. We must look at the decision not as the
chemist, biologist or statistician that we are qualified neither by
training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising our
narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal stan-
dards of rationality. I"
Judge Leventhal, in his concurrence, interpreted the majority
opinion as advocating no substantive review at all.' 2' He stated
that this type of review does not fulfill the reviewing court's
mandate of ensuring that the agency outlines its objectives in a
rational and nondiscriminatory manner so that its delegated
power is exercised only within its statutory parameters. 25 Judge
Leventhal stated that when an agency is confronted with a fac-
tually based challenge, the court must examine the evidence and
findings of fact to ensure that the evidentiary fact findings are
supported by the record and that they provide a rational basis for
inferences of ultimate fact. 2 If the agency's decision is within a
zone of reasonableness, though not the one the court would have
I Judge Wright assumed that informal rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) is
reviewed under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), under which agency action is upset if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
See note 67 supra.
'" 541 F.2d at 34.
I Id. at 34-35.
"' Id. at 34-35 n.74.
' Id. at 36 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
12, Id. at 68 (Leventhal, J., concurring without reservation).




chosen, it must be sustained. One of the least intrusive but most
effective methods of review is to have the agency comply with
certain minimal procedural safeguards. These procedures will
vary from problem to problem and must be fitted in an ad hoc
fashion to the issues at hand.'
Judge Wilkey, in his dissenting opinion," 8 applied Overton
Park's substantial inquiry analysis by focusing on the "clear error
of judgment" language, which allows a reviewing court to over-
turn agency action even if there is evidence in the record support-
ing the agency decision.' After reviewing the whole record, a
court may conclude that the agency erred in exercising its rule-
making power, because the evidence against the agency's conclu-
sion is overwhelming and persuasive, the agency's approach is
one-sided, the decisionmaking process is flawed, or an essential
point or element is missing in the logical progression towards the
agency's conclusion.'30 The court's task on review is "to explore
the evidentiary record to determine whether the statements and
conclusions of fact have an adequate basis in the underlying evi-
dence" and to determine whether the agency decision is
"principled and reasonable."'' In applying this standard, the
dissent concluded that the Administrator had made clear errors
in his analytical and evaluative methodology and in his decision-
making process. Several vital links in EPA's chain of reasoning
were unsupported, its conclusions were thus arbitrary and capri-
cious, and the court's proper action should have been to remand.
Judge Skelly Wright, another judge in this circuit, has stated
that APA section 706 requires substantive review."' The arbitrary
and capricious standard does not apply to the fact-finding, fact-
predicting, and factual reasoning process which leads an agency
to adopt a rule. A contrary interpretation of this standard would
reduce judicial review to "a relatively futile exercise in formal-
"' See generally Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
11 541 F.2d at 70 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey was joined in this opinion
by Circuit Judges Tamm and Robb.
I" Id. at 98.
130 Id.
"I Id. at 100.
"12 Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review,
59 CORNELL L. REv. 375 (1974).
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ism.' ' 33 However, Judge Wright went on to state that a reviewing
court is not authorized to examine whether the agency's empirical
conclusions have support in substantial evidence and emphasized
that a court may not substitute its judgments for the agency's.'
3
D. Judicial Expansion of Section 553 Requirements
Courts have begun to explore the full reach of section 553
requirements. An expanded interpretation of this section's re-
quirements has resulted from the confluence of constraining ad-
ministrative discretion, making factual determinations in infor-
mal rulemaking proceedings, and reviewing administrative ac-
tion. Courts reinterpreted section 553 requirements in order to
effectuate these three principles; indeed, some courts read the
statutory requirements so expansively as to be accused of creating
a new type of rulemaking unconnected with the APA.' 35 The origi-
nal decisions mandating hybrid rulemaking procedures were
premised on basic considerations of fairness, ,36 because the courts
did not have the crucial element of Overton Park's aggressive
technique of judicial review and were forced to rely upon their
misgivings about the extent of administrative discretion and the
adequacy of notice and comment procedures to answer factual
questions. After Overton Park, the courts gained momentum in
prescribing adjudicatory procedures. This momentum was com-
pletely dissipated by the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. ,37 The three following subsections outline the presently
existing requirements of section 553.
' Id. at 390.
,' Id. at 391.
' See FitzGerald, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission and the Flexibility
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 26 AD. L. REv. 287 (1974).
" ' Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
W No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1,978). Before explaining the present judicial interpre-
tation of section 553, a caveat is necessary. The Supreme Court severely chastised the
Court of Appeals and minced no words in its condemnation of the appellate court's
interpretation of the administrative-judicial relationship. Consequently, other inroads
which courts have made on the administrative process may be in jeopardy and a court
may be acting ultra vires if it imposes any requirement in excess of the bare minimum
requirements of section 553. Courts may hereafter be hesitant to broadly interpret any of
the procedural requirements of section 553, but may focus more closely on the adequacy




Agencies intending to promulgate rules under the auspices of
section 553 must publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking
in the Federal Register. The notice must include inter alia,
"either the terms of substance of the proposed rule or a descrip-
tion of the subjects and issues involved."'3 8 The legislative history
of the APA explains that this requirement was included because
public rulemaking would be of little value either to interested
parties or to the agency unless notice is promulgated in advance
so that interested parties could provide input. 3'
Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 10 demonstrates how agency action
can be overturned for failing to comply with the notice require-
ment. In Mobil Oil, the Federal Power Commission published a
notice that it was considering the adoption of a general policy
statement concerning transportation rates for natural gas."' The
notice concerned only the wisdom of establishing such a policy
and comments were limited to that issue. After the agency re-
ceived comments from concerned groups, meetings were held
with some interested parties. At the conclusion of the meetings,
further conferences were deferred, and shortly thereafter the FPC
issued an order setting generally applicable rates for the transpor-
tation of hydrocarbons"2 without benefit of the requisite technical
and factual data on costs ordinarily required in ratemaking
14 3
The court reversed the FPC order and remanded to the Commis-
sion for further proceedings because the Commission's notice was
inadequate for a proceeding fixing specific mandatory rates."
"' 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1976).
'9 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946).
140 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" ' Notice of proposed statement of general policy concerning charges for transporting
liquids and liquifiable hydrocarbons. 33 Fed. Reg. 2860 (1968).
",2 Order establishing charges for transporting liquids and liquifiable hydrocarbons.
37 Fed. Reg. 2954 (1972).
" 483 F.2d at 1244-45.
" d. at 1263. Another panel of the same court in American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC
498 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1974), held that the FPC's use of a rulemaking format that
combined written statements, public hearings to receive oral statements, and written
rebuttal submission was adequate. The Mobil decision was distinguished on the ground
that the notice had been inadequate and the FPC had relied on data obtained by informal
and, to some extent, ex parte procedures. By contrast, the FPC in American Public Gas
had clearly stated the issues and had given the parties an adequate opportunity to partici-
pate. Id. at 723.
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Thus, the notice will be scrutinized on review to determine if the
enacted rule is outside the scope of the proposed rulemaking no-
tice, because one of the functions of judicial review is to deter-
mine if the agency considered all relevant comments prior to
enactment of the rule.' If potential participants are unaware or
misapprehend the scope of a proceeding, they are unable to sub-
mit comments, thus depriving the agency of their input.
The notice of proposed rulemaking must be "sufficiently de-
scriptive of the 'subjects and issues involved' so that interested
parties may offer informed criticism and comments.""' The re-
quirement of giving notice of the "issues involved" could be read
as mandating that agencies disgorge the data and policies under-
lying the proposed rule." ' Notices should contain the proposed
regulation and a statement of its factual premises and methodol-
ogy, including its tentative empirical findings and a description
of the critical experiments and methodological techniques.' All
significant information developed during the rulemaking must be
made available to the participants prior to issuance of the final
regulations. If an agency does not fully comply with these direc-
tives, its decision can be overturned for failure to observe "a
procedure required by law""' 9 or because objectors are denied an
opportunity to participate (by probing the agency's analysis and
by providing information).
The decision in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus150
emphasized the importance of promulgating a complete notice
which indicates the major issues to be resolved, and how notice
relates to the other requirements of informal rulemaking. In this
case, EPA decided not to defer for one year the effective date of
the Clean Air Act's 1975 automobile emission control standards.
The act provided that engines manufactured in model year 1975
should have a ninety percent reduction in the emission of carbon
" See text accompanying notes 212-230 infra.
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974) and Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
" See Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking,
26 AD. L. REv. 999, 204 (1974).
"I International Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
14' 5 U.S.C. § 706(D) (1976).
5 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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monoxide and hydrocarbons over 1970 model engines.1 5' A one
year suspension from these standards could be granted by EPA
if it determined after a "public hearing" that the technology to
meet the 1975 standards was not available. 52 As EPA based its
determination on a complex "prediction methodology" never re-
vealed to the automobile companies, the court remanded the case
to EPA for further consideration and imposed upon the agency
the requirement of providing "the parties . . . [an] opportunity
. . . to address themselves to matters not previously put before
them." 53
The remand was premised on the court's perception that the
notice requirement of APA section 553 was not adequately com-
plied with, because the prediction methodology should have been
published prior to EPA's final decision.'" As the automobile in-
dustry raised serious questions about EPA's methodology, it
should have been provided with an opportunity to challenge the
critical steps of EPA's reasoning process. The auto companies
had put forth all of their available data, but EPA merely rebutted
it with their prediction methodology without any supporting
data. If this were allowed to be sufficient, the information ad-
duced by the auto companies would be effectively meaningless,
and they would be effectively precluded from challenging EPA's
data.
In Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,'5 5 EPA's regula-
tions were rejected because the petitioner was unable to obtain
critical information which formed a partial basis for the final
regulations.' 8 The petitioners were, thus, effectively denied an
adequate opportunity to comment on the proposed standards
because of EPA's failure to disclose the detailed findings and
1S, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(5)(D) (Supp. V 1975).
" 478 F.2d at 649.
254 The necessities of judicial review also provided impetus for the court's expansive
reading of the notice requirement. Neither the majority opinion by Judge Leventhal nor
the concurrence by Chief Judge Bazelon attempted to describe the standard of review in
traditional APA terms, i.e., arbitrary or capricious or substantial evidence. However, both
judges agreed that the function of judicial review is to require reasoned decisionmaking
to assure that the agency procedures provide a structure for agency decisionmaking, and
both evinced a growing dissatisfaction with the traditional rational basis standard. 478
F.2d at 649.
1- 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
1' Id. at 392-93.
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procedures of relevant EPA-sponsored tests. 5 In referring to sec-
tion 553 requirements the court states, "Obviously a prerequisite
to the ability to make meaningful comment is to know the basis
upon which the rule is proposed."' 58 The court stated that infor-
mation forming the basis of a rule should be disclosed as early as
possible, generally at the time of issuance.
15
2. Failure to Provide an Opportunity to Participate
Section 553(c) provides that after notice the agency must
give "interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity for oral presentation."' 60 Hybrid rule-
making was partially premised on and can be partially explained
by this statutory requirement.
a. The rationale of hybrid rulemaking
Courts which mandated hybrid procedures refused to apply
the expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle of statutory
construction to section 553(c) procedural safeguards. On the con-
trary, they attempted to expand this requirement beyond recog-
nition. The adjudicatory procedures imposed by some courts were
designed to facilitate judicial review and to assure meaningful
participation with consequent reasoned decisionmaking and
analysis by the agency.''1
The court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
NR C112 stated that participation under this section must be
meaningful: "[W]e would expect that [the NRC] will endeavor
to allow meaningful participation by the public interest groups
whose limited resources often relegate them to the role of contest-
ing the studies and conclusions of industry participants. '" 163 Par-
Is d. at 402.
"s Id. at 393 n.67.
's, Id. at 394.
" 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1946). Some of the hybrid rulemaking
cases partially relied on the legislative history which explains that because an agency is
not a representative entity, "public participation ... in the rulemaking process is essen-
tial to inform [the agency] and to afford safeguards to private interests." Id.
162 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded to determine mootness, 434
U.S. 1030 (1978). This decision was vacated as moot in light of NRC's termination of
GESMO (Generic Environmental Statement Mixed Oxide Fuel). 42 Fed. Reg. 65,334
(1977).
1" 539 F.2d at 839 (emphasis added). Accord, Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
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tially based on such a premise, courts determined what proce-
dures would allow participation to be meaningful and required
the "hybrid modes of procedure most appropriate to the issues
and circumstances."'' 4 Judge Wikley in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC6 5
reasoned that if a court knows the degree of evidentiary support
required to establish a factual predicate, the court would know
the type of rulemaking procedures which must be designed to
create this support and which would be required to uphold the
agency's decision.' The required procedure is not contingent
upon the classification of the activity, but depends on the import-
ance of the issues before the agency and the kinds of questions
involved.'67 Complex questions should be "resolved in the crucible
of debate through the clash of informed but opposing scientific
and technological viewpoints."' 68 However, neither a formal hear-
ing nor cross-examination is required if an adequate opportunity
to participate in developing the relevant evidence in an
"adversary setting" exists.' The court in Walter Holm & Co. v.
Hardin, 170 stated that an opportunity to present an effective pres-
entation is essential to ensure that the agency will take a hard
look at the problems in light of the written submissions.' Judge
Leventhal, summarizing what adjudicatory procedures are re-
quired, stated: "What counts is the reality of an opportunity to
submit an effective presentation, to assure that the Secretary and
his assistant will take a hard look at the problems in light of those
submissions."
72
486 F.2d 375, 393 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
IU Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1973).
"' 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"' Id. at 1257.
67 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500-01 (4th Cir. 1973). Cf. Walter
Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
" Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"' American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
.70 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"I Id. at 1016. The court here was also concerned that the Secretary of Agriculture
was abusing his discretion by circumventing the statutorily imposed hearing procedure
under section 8c of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 608c
(1976). As a means of limiting this discretion, the court of appeals directed the district
court to issue a declaratory judgment that petitioners were entitled to a hearing with a
limited right of cross-examination on "crucial" issues. Id. The court stated that where
petitioners made "a not insubstantial claim that an effective showing requires oral presen-
tation to Department officials . . . this right is available to them." Id.
'" Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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The court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC 3 explained its ration-
ale' for imposing hybrid procedures by stating that the APA is
not dichotomized into two mutually exclusive procedures; rather,
it outlines a continuum of available hybrid procedures located
between the minimum and maximum articulated in section 553
and sections 556 and 557, respectively.' Flexibility in fitting
administrative procedures to particular functions was declared to
be the touchstone in evaluating the APA. 171 This flexible attitude
towards procedure is designed to assist eclectic agencies in meet-
ing the multifarious situations arising as a result of their diverse
statutory authorization. However, the court failed to recognize an
unwanted ramification of this analysis, viz., administrative agen-
cies would be placed in the quandry of choosing in advance the
appropriate procedure from a limitless variety of permutations
within the APA's boundaries. Once the putative dichotomy under
the APA is abandoned, the type of procedures in a rulemaking
proceeding becomes a litigable issue. The agency could be certain
that it utilized the proper procedural devices only in an ex post
facto fashion after the rendering of an appellate opinion. A simi-
lar analysis prompted the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. I" to negate any further judicial imposition of adjudicatory
procedures.
b. Vermont Yankee
The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation applied for
a license to operate its nuclear plant, and, upon NRDC's objec-
tion to the granting of the license, a hearing was held on the
0 ' 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
114 Another potential rationale was that the section 553(c) requirement of giving inter-
ested persons an opportunity to participate "with or without opportunity for oral presenta-
tion," grants the agency discretion to decide whether such an opportunity will be granted;
but since a court is authorized to set aside agency action found to be "an abuse of
discretion," denial of such a request can be held to be reversible error. See Chemical
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 925, 946 (D. Del. 1973). Thus,
whenever a rulemaking proceeding involves a contested factual issue which is crucial in
determining the reasonableness of the rule and which is readily susceptible to the taking
of evidence, an agency may abuse its discretion if it fails to conduct an evidentiary
hearing. See Claggett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Devel-
opments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 78, 86.
"7' 483 F.2d at 1251.
176 Id.
I" No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
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application.'78 The licensing board excluded testimony involving
the environmental effects of operations to reprocess and dispose
of nuclear fuel as not required under NEPA and granted the
operating license. Subsequently, a generic rulemaking was initi-
ated by the Commission to specifically deal with the question of
these environmental effects. Although discovery and cross-
examination were not allowed, extensive background documents
were publicly available, all participants were granted a reason-
able opportunity to present their positions, written and oral state-
ments were received, and all persons giving oral statements were
subject to cross-examination by the hearing board.7 ' After the
hearing was completed, the Commission approved the rulemak-
ing procedures, adopted a rule based on the data collected, and
declared that, because the environmental effects are
"insignificant," the NEPA benefit-cost analysis would not be af-
fected and the granting of Vermont Yankee's operating license
would not have to be reexamined.1s° The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the portion of the order
which adopted a regulation concerning nuclear waste, held that
these environmental effects had to be analyzed in each licensing
proceeding, and, consequently, reversed the grant of Vermont
Yankee's license. 8'
After reading the lower court as invalidating the regulation
because of the inadequacy of the procedures employed, the Su-
preme Court reversed. The Court held that in the absence of
constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstan-
ces, "the administrative agencies 'should be free to fashion their
own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable
of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.' ""'2
The Court left no doubt but that the agencies, not the courts,
determine what extra procedural devices should be employed. 83
"I Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman et al., No. 76-528 (1978) (concerning review
of the Commission's procedures in a formal adjudicatory proceeding).
'J No. 76-419, slip op. at 6-7 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
" Id. at 8. The Commission also vacated the Appeal Board decision in Vermont
Yankee insofar as it differed from the rule as adopted. The Commission decided to require
licensing boards to consider the environmental effects as they are enumerated in Table
S-3, 10 C.F.R. 51.20(e) (1977).
1 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d at 641, 655.
I' d. at 21 (citing FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965), quoting from FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)).
I No. 76-419, slip op. at 24 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
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The Court held that a court cannot review and overturn a rule-
making proceeding on the basis of what procedural devices were
employed, so long as the agency employs at least the APA mini-
mums.' 4 The Court went on to explain that the proper scope of
judicial review of agency action comprehends a determination of
the adequacy of the record.'85 If the record is deemed inadequate,
it will be remanded, and the agency will be allowed to "exercise
its administrative discretion in deciding how, in light of internal
organization considerations, it may best proceed to develop the
I" Id. at 26. In order to evaluate the effect of the Court's opinion, the cases relied on
by it must be analyzed. The Supreme Court was interpreting the requirements of the APA,
but none of the holdings relied on by the Court [for the proposition that the APA does
not authorize courts to prescrive prescribe procedures] are on point. FPC v. Transconti-
nental Gas Pipeline Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976), dealt with a court of appeals order which
directed the FPC how to investigate a claim and which deferred its review of the Commis-
sion's order pending the investigation. This case was based on an interpretation of section
19(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970), which stated that the Commis-
sion must have the opportunity to review its order based on the evidence it obtained after
remand. The appellate court's method directly contravened the statutory procedure.
Similarly, FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1964), involved an interpretation of section
4(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 154(j) (1958), which expressly grants
the FCC broad discretion in how to conduct its proceedings to grant licenses. In this case,
the appellate court totally usurped the Commission's function in direct contravention of
the act by not only prescribing the procedures to be used, but by also making the initial
decision on the evidence collected after remand. 381 U.S. at 333. FCC v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1939), also involved an interpretation of the Communications
Act and the respective roles played by the FCC and the courts under it.
Civil Aeronautics Board v. Herman, 353 U.S. 322 (1956), involved an interpretation
of section 1004(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 102 1021, as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 644(b) (1970). The Court in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1945) held that section 9 of the Federal Trade Comm'n Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat.
717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 99 41-51 (1970)), contained no provision for
judicial review of the applicability of the act to the subject company prior to judicial
enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944),
involved judicial acceptance of procedures devised by the Labor Board, not the imposition
of procedures by a court. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943), con-
strued the Walsh-Healy Act, ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936) (current version at 41 U.S.C.
99 35-45 (1970)), as precluding district court review of whether the act applies to the
subject company when the agency authorized to administer the act applies for a subpoena
duces tecum. Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939),
involved a construction of section 10(a) of the Bituminous Coal Act, ch. 127, 50 Stat. 72
(1937) (version at 15 U.S.C. § 838 (1937) eliminated), and whether a petition for an
injunction stated a cause of action. Finally, Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States,
288 U.S. 294 (1933), construed section 315 of the Tariff Act, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 941 (1922)
(current version in scattered sections of 19,31,46 U.S.C.), which gave the Tariff Commis-
sion board authority "to adopt such reasonable procedures, rules, and regulations as it
may deem necessary." Additionally, almost all of these cases preceded the APA so that
they could in no way be deemed authority for a construction of it.
I" No. 76-419, slip op. at 22 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
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needed evidence and how its prior decision should be modified in
light of such evidence as develops."1 " Because the Court was not
certain whether the proceedings had provided a sufficient basis
upon which to predicate the rule, the decision was remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further review.
The Court also recognized that in exceptional circumstances,
"when an agency is making a 'quasi-judicial' determination by
which a very small number of persons are exceptionally affected,
in each case upon individual grounds," additional procedures
may be required."7 However, this is the type of exception which
would be rarely utilized in the nuclear regulatory context, be-
cause these proceedings have at least an indirect effect on many
people.
3. Failure to Clarify Basis for Administrative Decision
Section 553(c) directs agencies "[aifter consideration of the
relevant matter presented" to "incorporate in the rules adopted
a concise general statement of their basis and purpose." These
statements must be more than mere boilerplate.'" They should
serve as detailed, substantive support for the rule by outlining
crucial empirical and policy issues, pointing to support in the
record for the agency decision, and responding to all significant
objections to the agency's approach and methodology submitted
by the participants. 8 The agency should explain its actions by
articulating with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision and by
identifying the significance of crucial facts."" If the agency does
not comply with this directive, a court may refuse to approve the
rule as adopted and may remand to the agency to obviate any
frustration of judicial review and to ensure that the agency gave
reasoned considerations to all material facts and issues.", This is
"Id.
'7 Id. at 20. The Court failed to address how a lack of procedures would violate the
APA in this context.
' See Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1968), where the court warned against reading the adjectives "concise" and "general" too
literally.
" See, e.g., Pillai v. CAB, 485 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1973); National Air Carrier Ass'n
v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
'go Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
"I Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968); Scenic Hudson Preser-
vation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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also necessary to ensure that participants are not deprived of the
means to file an intelligent petition for reconsideration, 2 and
that the agency retains an early opportunity to be appraised of
and to correct any errors it may have committed. 9 '
This requirement codifies a long line of decisions requiring
agencies which issue reviewable orders to sufficiently explain
their actions so that judicial review is feasible. 14 If no such re-
quirement existed, regulations would be affirmed whenever a re-
viewing court could derive any reasonable rationale for their
adoption." 5 Elucidation of the reasons and policies underlying an
agency decision assists the judiciary in fulfilling its function of
ensuring that agency action is the result of fair and reasoned
decision-making.' A court is able to determine whether the
agency gave the required consideration only if the agency articu-
lates the basis of its decision and identifies the facts which it
considered significant. "7 This aspect of the supervisory function
requires more active interference with an agency if the court sus-
pects that the agency has not taken a "hard look" at the salient
problems and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-
making.' In the words of Judge Leventhal this process
"combines judicial supervision with a salutory principle of judi-
cial restraint, an awareness that agencies and courts together
constitute a 'partnership' in furtherance of the public interest,
and are 'collaborative instrumentalities of justice.' "'"
The decision in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus2rl demonstrates that agency action unaccompanied
"1 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976) states "Each agency shall give an interested person the
right to petition for the . ..repeal of a rule."
, Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); American Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 179 F.2d 437 Cir. 1949); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir.
1938).
, Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"' In view of this limited purpose, statements of less than ideal clarity have been held
to be sufficient. See New York Freight Forwarders and Brokers Ass'n v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 337 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 190 (1965).
" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 381 U.S. 80 (1943); City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
Pikes Peak Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 979 (1969); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"I Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 842, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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by an adequate explanation is not acceptable. In this case, the
Secretary of Agriculture refused to suspend the federal registra-
tion for a pesticide under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act. 201 Although the Secretary recognized a substan-
tial question concerning the safety of DDT, he concluded that a
summary suspension of its registration as interim relief during
the administrative process was not warranted. This conclusion
reflected both a factual determination and the application of a
legal standard. The Secretary was required to first determine
what harm may result and, based on his determination of the
magnitude and probability of the anticipated harm, he must then
decide whether this amounts to an "imminent hazard to the pub-
lic." 1 The court of appeals remanded because the Secretary had
not given "an adequate explanation for his decision to deny in-
terim relief."' " The Secretary should have determined whether
the available information called for suspension by identifying the
relevant factors and by relating the evidence to those factors in a
statement of reasons.
2 04
The Secretary has an obligation to limit the extent of his
discretion by formulating suspension standards either by promul-
gating regulations or by articulating his criteria in each individ-
ual decision. 201 The reviewing court cannot assume that proper
standards are implicit in every exercise of administrative discre-
tion.206 Chief Judge Bazelon in this decision made no attempt to
designate the scope of review in traditional APA terms, but fo-
cused on the importance of providing a structure for the exercise
of administrative discretion.2 07 If a "framework for principled de-
cisionmaking" is provided, the importance of judicial review will
be diminished by the concomitant enhancement of the adminis-
trative process and the improvement in the quality of judicial
review where judicial review is sought.208 Judicial review can cor-
rect only the most flagrant abuses so it must operate to ensure
-1 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1970). The statutory scheme is summarized in Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1095 nn.2-4 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
22 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970).







that the administrative process itself will confine and control the
exercise of discretion.' 9
The court in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus
2 10
used a burden of proof analysis to reach a similar conclusion.
After the automobile manufacturers established their argument
for the infeasibility of the emission standards, EPA was required
to sustain the "burden of adducing a reasoned presentation sup-
porting the reliability of methodology. 2 11 The court remanded
the case because the Administrator had failed to make such a
presentation. The court thus used a burden-of-going-forward ra-
tionale as a device for controlling the risk of error. Although the
court was hesitant to interfere with EPA's resolution of a scien-
tific issue, it refused to defer blindly to whatever methodology
EPA chose to support its analysis.
In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,212 the court determined
that the minimal requirements of section 553 were sufficient for
the promulgation of national secondary ambient air quality stan-
dards under the Clean Air Act.213 However, because EPA failed
to disclose the basis of its action, the record was remanded for the
Administrator to supply an implementing statement explaining
his basis for the standard to aid the court's reviewing function.2 1,
Although the minimal requirement of incorporation of a state-
ment of basis and purpose was complied with, the requirements
of judicial review and "fairness" required additional exposition.t 5
The court stated that, inherent in its reviewing responsibility is
a requirement that it be given sufficient indication of the basis
of the administrator's decision to enable it to consider whether
the decision embodies an abuse of discretion or an error of law.
2
1
Although the APA does not expressly require that agencies
respond to the multifarious contentions addressed in the written
comments, the necessity of providing a statement of basis and
purpose has been construed to include the requirement of re-
/" Id.
210 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"I Id. at 643.
212 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2,1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-3, 4 (1970).
211 462 F.2d at 850.
215 Id.
"I Id. at 849.
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sponding to significant adverse comments which offer specific
contentions rebutting the factual foundations of the rule. "' The
court in Rodway v. United States Department of Agriculture218
held that the statement of basis and purpose is designed to re-
quire the agency to prepare a reasoned response to the comments
received, to explain how the agency resolved any significant prob-
lems raised by the comments, and to show how that resolution
culminated in the ultimate rule adopted.21 1 This statement is
"inextricably intertwined with the receipt of comments. ' 220 If a
party can demonstrate that a rule was promulgated without con-
sideration of the submitted comments, the courts will reverse the
agency's action as arbitrary and capricious. 22 However, the
agency can limit the extent of its response to preserve the effi-
ciency of the rulemaking process.
22
The proposed rule's opponent's primary method for exposing
weakness or error in the agency's premises and methodology is the
comments he submits. If an agency is permitted to ignore them
or to denigrate their importance by providing a cursory review
and no response, the agency is rendering the opponent's partici-
pation meaningless. Agencies must closely evaluate these com-
ments to be able to prepare a response. If no response is forthcom-
ing, the reviewing court cannot determine whether the agency
took the requisite hard look, whether the decision was based on
217 Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973), See Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
- Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
211 Id. at 817; See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.
1970); cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
n' Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, (D.C. Cir. 1975). In
support of this statement the court reasoned:
The APA requires the reviewing court to "review the whole record" in mea-
suring the validity of agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). The whole record
in an informal rule-making case is comprised of comments received, hearings
held, if any, and the basis and purpose statement. In this case, there is
plainly no whole record to review and the District Court could not perform
its appellate function. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 817.
" See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
491 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1974).
I See Owensboro On the Air, Inc. v. United States, 262 F.2d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir.
1958), where the court stated "Surely every time the [FCC] decided to take account of
some additional factor it was not required to start the proceedings all over again. If such
were the rule the proceeding might never be terminated." Accord, International Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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a consideration of the relevant factors, or whether the agency
committed a clear error of judgment.r When an agency decision
is remanded because of failure to respond to significant com-
ments, the remand is in aid of the judicial review function, rather





Cement manufacturers sought review of EPA's promulgation
of stationary source standards for new or modified Portland ce-
ment plants pursuant to the Clean Air Act in Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckleshaus.2 2 The court remanded because EPA failed
to respond to significant adverse comments concerning legitimate
problems with EPA's test methodology. 22 Agencies must demon-
strate that they have given serious consideration to the submitted
comments and a reviewing court may demand reasoned explana-
tions for controversial empirical and normative agency determi-
nations. The agency has substantial latitude over the format of
the statement, but it must refer to relevant submissions by par-
ticipants and should rebut or accept these submissions in an
orderly fashion. The agency's duty to rationalize its decision is
not met by post hoc rationalizations offered for the first time
2n Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
7 The Supreme Court in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (per curiam), outlined
the proper procedure to be followed when a reviewing court decides that an administrative
agency's stated justification for informal agency adjudication does not provide an ade-
quate basis for judicial review. Although this case dealt with informal adjudication, the
Court did not focus on the rulemaking-adjudication distinction, but rather on the appro-
priate method for reviewing informal agency action. See Tabor v. Joint Bd. For Enroll-
ment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The appropriate standard of review
was whether the Comptroller's decision was the "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" as specified by APA section 706(2)(A). If
the failure to explain the administrative action frustrates review, the remedy is to remand
to the agency for it to provide "either through affidavits or testimony, such additional
explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove necessary." 411 U.S. at
143.
The court in Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir.
1977), described the procedure to be utilized when an agency involved in informal rule-
making does not incorporate a statement of basis and purpose in the adopted rules. The
proper method is to vacate the rules and remand to the agency to enable it to adopt
regulations accompanied by a sufficient statement. Id. at 711. Accord, Rodway v. United
States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But cf. National Food Ass'n v.
Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975) (wherein the court did not vacate the rules and
remand, but allowed the agency to present the necessary statement through affidavits or
testimony before the court. Id. at 701.)
n' 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
22 Id. at 393.
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during judicial review of the agency action.2 Unless an adequate
agency response is prepared, the court cannot determine whether
the agency took the requisite "hard look" at the problem in-
volved.
Although written comments were submitted as required,2
this was not sufficient to develop an adequate record and fulfill
the reviewing court's duty to consider whether "the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there
had been a clear error of judgment. '12 If the record contains only
ambiguous and conclusory statements about the basis of the rule,
and if a participant offers precise factual contentions rebutting
the factual foundation of the rule, the rule cannot be judicially
approved until factual clarification is achieved.130 If the record
fosters doubt about a necessary factual predicate of an otherwise
valid rule, the court is unable to affirm the rule.
Although imposing procedural requirements in excess of the
APA's minimums is no longer a viable option for courts to use
when reviewing informal rulemaking, it is clear that courts are no
longer bowing to bland assertions of administrative discretion.
Courts must still review the adequacy of the record, and agencies
must recognize that broadened participation facilitates the devel-
opment of an adequate record. The holdings of many hybrid rule-
making cases would not be greatly modified if the court was pre-
cluded from imposing procedures-the record would continue to
be inadequate. As Judge Friendly pointed out, 31 it is ultimately
of little consequence to the agency if a court invalidates the rule
because the record is inadequate or if the court goes a step further
and imposes ad hoc procedures to generate an adequate record.
In both cases, the rule is invalidated and further procedures are
necessary. Now that the later procedure is unavailable, the
agency must devise procedures designed to rectify the record with
no judicial assistance.
Increased judicial activity has encouraged agencies to modify
their rulemaking procedures and decisionmaking processes, espe-
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1962).
486 F.2d at 393 n.67.
Id. at 403 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971)).
g' 486 F.2d at 393-94.
' Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rv. 1267, 1314 (1975).
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cially for rules which involve highly complex technical or scien-
tific subject matters. Thus, if the nuclear power industry is to use
rulemaking as a reform technique and as a means of self-help, it
must request those procedures which are tailored to the subject
matter of their proposed rule. Pure notice and comment rulemak-
ing for important factual matters in the highly visible environ-
mental arena, curtailed by the hybrid rulemaking cases, may not
be completely revitalized, as Vermont Yankee merely placed the
onus on each agency to determine how to devise procedures which
will generate a proper record.
III. RULEMAKING AS A REFORM TECHNIQUE
In the absence of legislative reform designed to make licens-
ing more efficient, rulemaking presents an opportunity for self-
help reform. To be effective, the nuclear power industry must be
willing to play the rulemaking game by proposing, rather than
resisting, the appropriate degree of discovery and cross-
examination in NRC rulemaking proceedings. Discovery may be
used to significantly delay the proceeding, but it serves the valid
purpose of providing parties with enough information to ade-
quately advocate their interests.232 Cross-examination contains
the greatest potential for delay and it is also the most difficult
device for the hearing board to control, yet it may be useful for
developing an accurate and comprehensive record when complex
factual issues are involved.
Prior to proposing a rule, industry proponents should select
the most suitable procedural devices by considering the issues
involved and the experience and capacity of the agency. One of
the least intrusive, but most effective devices, is the use of inter-
rogatories among the participants and the agency. This approach
was utilized in both the GESM 0233 and the uranium fuel cycle
rulemakings .1 4 In both of these proceedings, written questions
were more efficacious than oral ones. Unfortunately, reliance on
written interrogatories is timeconsuming, the answers to techni-
cal questions are often labored and drafted by nontechnical coun-
sel, and this device ordinarily requires followup questions to be
212 Note, The Use of Generic Rulemaking To Resolve Environmental Issues in Nuclear
Power Plant Licensing, 61 VA. L. REV. 869, 897 (1975).
11 39 Fed. Reg. 43,101 (1974).
2' Prehearing Conference Order, Docket No. 50-3 (August 12, 1977).
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effective."' If a second round of followup questions is required,
they can be propounded at a legislative-type hearing, as occurred
in the second phase of the uranium fuel cycle proceeding. 3 1 When
there are many participants involved, the most efficient proce-
dure is to have oral questions propounded by the hearing board.
The most intrusive procedural device, cross-examination, is
extremely time consuming and should be infrequently requested.
Commentators have disagreed over the effectiveness of cross-
examination to resolve scientific controversies.2 37 Professor Robin-
son has argued that cross-examination requires "the agency to
explain and articulate the assumptions and the foundations on
which its policies rest,2 3 but he has not demonstrated that less
intrusive methods would not be equally efficacious. Conversely,
other commentators have stated that cross-examination fre-
quently achieves little that could not be obtained by other de-
vices. 238 The utility of cross-examination cannot be generalized
because its utility is situation-specific, i.e., it may be effective in
some situations, but may be time consuming and ineffective in
others.
This device may also give leverage to opponents of a pro-
posed rule. It presents an opportunity for delay; it gives challeng-
ers a bargaining tool; and it subtly exerts pressure on the propo-
nent to take a milder stand, so that the heavy investment of
resources involved in supporting the more extreme position in
1 In the long run, reliance on interrogatories is much more efficient than relying on
an oral hearing to obtain the information. Compare In Re Acceptance Criteria for Emer-
gency Core Cooling, Systems for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors, AEC
Docket RM-50-1 (37 Fed. Reg. 288 (1972) (adjudicatory procedures adopted after initial
notice of proposed rulemaking)), with In Re Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel
Cycle, NRC Docket No. 50-3 (37 Fed. Reg. 24, 191 (1972) (notice of proposed rulemaking;
procedures will not include cross-examination or discovery)).
"I Prehearing Conference Order, Docket No. 50-3 (August 12, 1977).
117 Compare Johnston, AEC Rulemaking and Public Participation, 62 GEo. L.J. 1737,
1743 (1974); (cross-examination is effective as it reveals value judgments underlying
"objective" conclusions), with Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings
for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 111, 129
(1972) (cross-examination may hamper rather than advance accurate factual resolution
of complex scientific issues).
" Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 522 (1970).
' See, e.g., Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure
Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 430-45 (1975).
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cross-examination is not required. 40 However, cross-examination
may also have the beneficial effect of discouraging participation
by persons who oppose a rule on general grounds, but who pos-
sess no helpful expertise, because they too will have to invest
substantial resources if they desire to testify in the proceeding.
Cross-examination may also play a crucial role in elucidating
issues in some rulemaking contexts. Additionally, the very exist-
ence of a right to cross-examination may inhibit falsehood and
shoddy analysis, or it may lead a witness to bring out information
adverse to his position on direct to prevent its disclosure on cross-
examination.
If NRC proposes an unsatisfactory rule, a critic of the rule
may request that the agency furnish a statement of methodology
prior to any final agency action in order to propagate detailed
criticism.141 Such a procedure is exemplified by EPA's process of
promulgating effluent limitation guidelines under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.242 This is essentially a two-round
process in which EPA provides interested persons a technical
analysis of the issues prepared by private consultants prior to its
initial notice of rulemaking. After the comments on the drafts are
received, EPA promulgates its proposed rule and its own draft
report attempting to substantiate the proposed rule.2 43 This pro-
cedure assures EPA that it will be aware of all the complex scien-
tific, technical, and economic issues.
There are disadvantages in using formal rulemaking to re-
form the nuclear licensing process, expecially in proceedings
which involve anything more than the minimum requirements of
section 553. Adjudicatory procedures may have the inherent pro-
clivity of encouraging a multiplicity of litigation and propagating
ponderous records which tend to frustrate organization. The rule
may not be adopted at all, or it may not be adopted as proposed.
Additionally, rulemaking proceedings can be very expensive and
drawn out, as the ECCS proceeding demonstrated. 4 4 However, if
adversity occurs, industry must have the resolve to finance its
"I Id. at 443.
21' Failure to grant such a request may furnish another basis for appeal. See notes
67-72 supra.
242 33 U.S.C. §§ 1257-1265 (Supp. V 1975).
2 38 Fed. Reg. 21,202-06 (1973).
244 See Freeman, The AEC's Recent Experiment in "Evidentiary" Rule Making, 28
Bus. LAw 663, 669-70 (1973).
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commitment and to carry the matter into the courtroom.
There is also a justifiable fear that opponents of nuclear
power would use the same tactics in rulemaking proceedings as
they use in licensing proceedings. Some nuclear opponents have
adopted a "no win" strategy in which the NRC licensing hearings
are not viewed in the traditional terms of winning or losing, but
are used as a means of achieving another objective-the ultimate
demise of nuclear power. 45 The environmentalists may also per-
ceive the hearing as an opportunity to debate the public policy
of using nuclear power. To further this aim, proceedings are
dramatized to increase media coverage.
24 6
Intervenors who oppose the construction of nuclear plants
frequently rest their cases entirely on delaying tactics and juris-
prudential gymnastics rather than on any substantive legal or
factual challenge. Rather than contest factors unique to each
plant, such as the adequacy of its radiation safeguards and the
expected local environmental effects, some opponents continue to
raise the same fundamental questions of fact, such as the basic
danger of nuclear power.47 Such contentions are not really fac-
tual, but are policy questions which should be resolved by the
NRC in a rulemaking proceeding, not in an individual licensing
proceeding.2 48 Delay and its consequent expense provide a potent
weapon and can be used to force a utility to accept more stringent
safeguards or extra equipment designed to further reduce any
environmental effects of the plant. 24 1 Environmentalists may also
seek judicial review to provide time to obtain an ultimate resolu-
tion through the political process and to engender support by
focusing legislative attention on their problems. 250 In this way,
benefits from lengthy administrative hearings are maximized
2 Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "No-
Win" Agency Proceeding, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1971).
24' Id.
24 See Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process:
Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace? 72 COLUM. L. REv. 963 (1972).
P' See Note, The Use of Generic Rulemaking To Resolve Environmental Issues in
Nuclear Power Plant Licensing, 61 VA. L. REv. 869 (1975). Indeed, Congress in enacting
the Atomic Energy Act and in funding the NRC each year has determined that nuclear
power is "good" and should be encouraged. Such a basic policy issue cannot ever appropri-
ately be before the NRC.
" Willrich, The Energy-Environment Conflict: Siting Electric Power Facilities, 58
VA. L. REV. 257, 326 (1972).
J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 114 (1971).
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even when the chances of an administrative victory are nonexis-
tent. The adoption of adjudicatory procedures in rulemaking pro-
ceedings may prompt use of the same or similar tactics.
2 51
Rulemaking proceedings can benefit the nuclear industry as
well as the opponents. First of all, it is much better to have the
NRC use adjudicatory procedures and to request them when ap-
propriate in petitions for rulemaking, than it is to have the result-
ing rules overturned on appeal because of an inadequate record.
For example, more preparation and analysis of the backend of the
fuel cycle would have expedited the first uranium fuel cycle rule-
making22 and, consequently, would have prevented the August,
1976, to December, 1976, nuclear licensing moratorium.2 15 The
industry should use their resources and do the studies and experi-
ments required to prove the practicability and usefulness of pro-
posed rules. It is better to invest time and resources in this type
of rulemaking effort than to be constantly confronted with delay
in individual licensing proceedings. If generic rules are adopted,
the effectiveness of nuclear opponent's delaying tactics in indi-
vidual licensing proceedings will ultimately be diminished.
Rulemaking proceedings can also be beneficial to the public.
"' Critics of nuclear power have substantially affected the nuclear industry. See
Freeman, The AEC's Recent Experiment in "Evidentiary" Rule Making, 28 Bus. LAw 663
(1973). For example, the nuclear opponents used their writings and testimony in licensing
proceedings to urge a reduction in the upper limits of radiological effluents from nuclear
plants during normal operating conditions. In response to these attacks, utilities volun-
teered to comply with much lower limits. One utility stated that it would be willing to
accept technical specifications limiting its nuclear releases to 1 percent of the existing
regulatory (10 C.F.R. § 20 (1977)) levels. This challenge also focused public attention on
the critics' exaggerated fears and prompted the AEC to promulgate Appendix I to X
C.F.R. § 50, which requires nuclear plants to be constructed and operated so as to hold
radioactive releases "as low as practicable."
" The NRC adopted table S-3 to quantify the environmental effects of the uranium
fuel cycle in the NEPA benefit-cost ratio in individual nuclear power plant licensing
proceedings. The portion of this table dealing with disposal of the radioactive wastes was
struck down by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d
633 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National
Defense Council, Inc., No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1978) because of inadequate develop-
ment of the administrative record. Even the Supreme Court's reversal of this case did not
end the matter, because the Court remanded to determine the adequacy of the record.
233 Immediately after the decision, the NRC placed a moratorium on licensing
of all current nuclear plant applications pending completion of a new rulemaking. 41
Fed. Reg. 34,707 & 34,408 (1976). Shortly after promulgating an interim rule, 41 Fed. Reg.
45,849 (1976), the NRC revoked the moratorium on pending applications, using the in-
terim rule to determine the environmental impact of new plants on the uranium fuel cycle.
41 Fed. Reg. 49,898 (1976).
VOL. 55
INFORMAL RULEMAKING
Broad participation by industry and public interest groups in an
adversary-type setting with the consequent airing of a wide range
of opinions and factual statements could minimize the possibility
of inaccurate determinations in the rulemaking.254 Such partici-
pation would test the premises upon which the proposed rule is
based and would increase the chances that the NRC would be
apprised of all the relevant facts.255 This would foster the legiti-
mate aims of the public interest groups, since they could focus
their merger resources in one proceeding without resorting to
using a "no win" strategy of delay in individual licensing proceed-
ings. From industry's standpoint the more an opponent's re-
sources are beneficially utilized in rulemaking efforts, the less
these resources can be used to delay individual proceedings. 56
Additionally, if opponents perceive a fair chance of influencing
NRC action, they may make less use of disruptive delaying tac-
tics in subsequent licensing proceedings. 57
Industry could petition for a number of rules which would
make future licensing proceedings more efficient and effective.
One obvious example is eliminating the necessity of considering
the need for power and alternative methods of generating power
at the operating license stage. 58 These matters are fully consid-
ered at the construction permit stage and it seems ludicrous to
require reconsideration after construction of the plant is com-
pleted and it is ready to operate. Another example is elimination
of the formal adjudicatory proceedings utilized for the issuance
of construction permits and operating licenses. The Atomic En-
ergy Act does not require adjudication; 2 1 this is only required by
NRC regulations.2e° While legislative proposals have been intro-
2" See Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the
Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 529-30 (1972).
" See Note, The Use of Generic Rulemaking To Resolve Environmental Issues in
Nuclear Power Plant Licensing, 61 VA. L. REv. 869, 882 (1975).
I' d.
'7 See Coggins, The Environmentalist's View of AEC's "Judicial Function, " 15
ATOM. EN. L.J. (1973).
" Such a proposal is contained in the President's nuclear licensing reform proposal.
See note 3, supra.
2'9 Bauser, The Development of Rulemaking Within the Atomic Energy Commission:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Valuable Legacy, 27 AD. L. REv. 165, 169 n.32
(1975). Cf. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 407 U.S. 908 (1972).
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duced to alter this situation, 6' no legal barrier prevents the NRC
from changing the structure of its hearings and not requiring
formal adjudicatory hearings in the absence of disputed facts or
issues. These are but two suggestions, but many more can be
devised. The industry should seriously consider utilizing rule-
making as an effective reform technique.
" 10 C.F.R. § 2.761a (1977).
'' See, e.g., Regulatory Procedures Reform Act, S. 2490, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
(introduced Feb. 6, 1978, and not yet acted on).
